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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2002, Petitioner filed with the lower court his postconviction petition seeking to 
conduct DNA testing on still extant forensic evidence from the investigation into the murder for 
which he stands convicted and sentenced to death. R. Vol I, p.5 et seq. Petitioner later moved in 
the court below to amend two counts into his petition. The lower court denied that motion and, 
because Petitioner then withdrew Count One, dismissed the matter. R. Vol. I, p.222. This is an 
appeal from the dismissal, addressing the lower court's denial of Petitioner's motion to amend 
two counts into his successive postconviction petition. 
Each of the two counts which Petitioner sought to amend into his petition concerned 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") testing of swabs used to recover evidence, which turned 
out to be semen, from the victim's mouth and vagina. The prosecution had conducted its own 
testing on the swabs before having them sent to the FBI. In particular, the Idaho crime lab 
performed PGM testing. That lab's test results showed that Petitioner could have been the 
contributor; that is, the state lab determined that Petitioner's and the swab's PGM shared certain 
features. However, the FBI lab conducted more refined PGM testing. Within forty-two days of 
filing his Motion To Amend Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner had learned that the 
FBI test results "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See Vol. I, 
p.123-7 (Ajfidavit In Support Of First Amended Petition For Post-conviction Relief at Exhibit 2 
(Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., sworn statement))). 
Petitioner's proposed Count Two alleged prosecutorial misconduct including the 
functional equivalent of suborning perjury during the jury trial, to the effect that Petitioner was a 




neither any of the offenses of conviction nor any of their lesser included offenses, and for proof 
he relied on the FBI' s PGM testing results and Dr. Hampikian' s affidavit as described above. 
This count alleged that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate his factual innocence of the 
offenses. 
A. Proposed Count Two's Three Critical Points: The Prosecution (1) Knew Or Should 
Have Known That FBI Pre-trial Testing Performed At The Prosecution's Request 
Excluded Petitioner As A Contributor Of The Semen Removed From The Victim; 
(2) Elicited But Did Nothing To Correct Patently False Trial Testimony From Its 
Forensic Expert That Petitioner Was A Potential Contributor Of The Semen 
Removed From The Victim, And It Failed To Correct That Same Expert's 
Misleading Testimony On Cross-Examination; And (3) Exacerbated This 
Misconduct By Asserting In Closing Argument To The Jury That Petitioner 
"Matched" The Semen When Its Expert Had (Falsely) Testified That Petitioner Was 
Only a Possible Contributor. 
Two documents were attached to Petitioner's Affidavit In Support Of First Amended 
Petition For Post-conviction Relief: (I) the FBI document dated about six months pre-trial which 
memorialized the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to the PGM testing for 
the prosecution by the state laboratory, of swabs of semen removed from the victim's mouth and 
vagina' (see R.Vol. I, p.120-22 (Exhibit 1)); and (2) the June 20, 2005, sworn statement, from 
Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State University associate 
professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice Administration,2 in which he 
'The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to 
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found 
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's 
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As 
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state 
laboratory. 
2Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to 
full professor and granted him tenure. 
2 
I 
noted that while the State of Idaho Forensic Laboratory testing on swabs of semen removed 
from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential contributor of the semen(,! .. 
. the more refined test performed by the FBI3, at the request of the Idaho lab, did absolutely 
exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See R. Vol I., p.123-7 (Exhibit 2)). 
To remove the possibility that a court might think that the information in Dr. 
Hampikian's June, 2005, affidavit was unavailable to forensic experts at and before the time of 
Petitioner's trial, Petitioner filed a second affidavit from Dr. Hampikian in December, 2005. In 
that supplemental affidavit, Dr. Hampikian attests that: 
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I 
reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally 
accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it 
also was a basic tool known to and employed by forensic experts in 
investigating offenses where evidence containing body fluids might 
help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I 
employed using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987, 
on a par with similar uses of blood typing test results. Indeed, the 
State crime laboratory letter to the FBI Laboratory's Forensic 
Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard and 
typical request when it was made on June 3, 1987. See Appendix 1 
(State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of 
Laboratories' senior Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum's letter to 
FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's correspondence shows clearly that the 
State of Idaho crime laboratory reflected the universal acceptance 
by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM subtyping 
and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I 
arrived at in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by 
the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear, 
unambiguous, and used a standard reporting language that would 
be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic biologist of the 
day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ... 
. This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the 
3Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI 
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit I and dated about six months pre-trial. 
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donor of the semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore, 
there is no indication in the FBI report that this finding could be an 
artifact, or that there was any evidence of a mixture in the sample. 
The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 1987 (as 
today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic) does 
not match the questioned semen sample (Ql) taken from the 
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of 
the semen sample Ql. 
R. Vol. I, p.199-202 ( emphasis added). 
that: 
The Affidavit In Support Of First Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief notes 
While [the prosecution] knew or should have known that the FBI 
laboratory report exonerated Petitioner, it not only failed to dismiss 
the charges against Petitioner, it elicited testimony from its forensic 
expert ... that his ... PGM test results revealed that Petitioner was a 
potential contributor of the semen recovered from the victim. See, 
e.g. Tr. at 1687-89. [Trial Tr.Vol. VI, p. 1687-89, esp. p. 1689, Ls. 
9-13.] 
R. Vol. I, p.115. The prosecution forensic expert also testified that the PGM test results from 
swabs of the crotch of the victim's sweatpants revealed that Petitioner was a potential 
contributor. 4 While the prosecution's forensic expert direct examination testimony was true as 
far as it went, the prosecution omitted to elicit information critical to fully and fairly evaluating 
the state crime laboratory's test results. Specifically, the prosecution failed to inform the jury 
through this expert witness or any other witness that the more refined FBI laboratory tests yielded 
results which contradicted the Idaho crime laboratory test results. In failing to do so, the 
prosecution engaged in the functional equivalent of suborning perjury. The prosecution 
exacerbated its misconduct by allowing its expert witness, on cross-examination, to further 




mislead the jury that the scientific testing conducted on the recovered semen inculpated 
Petitioner even though it knew or should have known that the testing exculpated him: 
Q. . .. Now, as I understand it, there's also other tests 
available to subtype or subclass the PGM 
readings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's a fact that you personally did not run any 
of those tests, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Would that not have been helpful to you in further 
including or excluding possible donors in this 
particular case? 
A. Those samples were sent off for that subtyping. 
Q. And they were also inclusive weren't they? 
A. I can't address those results, I did not do the 
analysis. 
Tr.at 1779. [Tr. Vol. VI,p. 1779.] 
R. Vol I, p.115 ( emphasis added). Worse, in closing argument, the prosecution transformed its 
forensic expert's sworn description of Petitioner as a possible contributor [in ]to a "match." 
Who matches that semen? Only the defendant, Paul Ezra Rhoades . 
. . . He, alone of the persons who had access, matches. 
And as between those two men seen in that van this defendant, 








There's an interesting point that both semen samples, that in the 
vagina and that in the mouth match this defendant, they match each 
other. What does that tell us? That they were deposited by the 
same individual. It's not coincidence that they're the same, but 
they're the same because they were deposited by this defendant. 
Tr. at 2120-21. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2120, Ls. 7-13 & 17-25; p. 2121, 
Ls. 1-3 & 11-16.) 
R. Vol. I, p.115-16 ( emphasis added). 
Based on the FBI document, Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement, and transcript excerpts, 
Petitioner moved to amend into his petition two counts (Counts Two and Three). In his proposed 
Count Two, Petitioner claimed that the prosecution's (1) failure to advise trial counsel or 
subsequent counsel of the FBI testing's exoneration of Petitioner, (2) failure to dismiss the 
charges against Petitioner, (3) failure to correct its expert witness' false and misleading 
testimony, and ( 4) exaggeration of that witness' testimony in guilt phase closing argument 
violated Petitioner's rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Napue v. lllinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 ( cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited) and 13 (due process guaranteed) of the Idaho Constitution, as 
well as Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636,647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests 
would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive 
post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed 
by prosecutorial misconduct."). As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count Two, this appeal is 
brought pursuant to those same authorities. 
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B. Proposed Count Three: Actual Innocence. 
In his proposed Count Three, Petitioner claimed that he was actually innocent of the 
offenses of conviction as well as any of their lesser included offenses. He claimed, alternatively, 
that if he was unable to meet the actual innocence burden required for release, he would at least 
meet the burden required to have all previously defaulted claimed considered on their merits. 
Proposed Count Three rested on the FBI's test report and Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement 
described above as well as the prosecution's contention that the rapist and killer was a single 
person. It was brought pursuant to Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (l 993); Jackson v. 
Calderon, 211 F .3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices 
in Herrera would have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298 (1995); Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho 
Constitution, Article 1, Sections I (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 (equal 
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas 
corpus guaranteed), 6 ( cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 ( due process guaranteed), 
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count 
Three, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities. 
C. The Lower Court's Rationale For Denying Petitioner's Motion To Amend: 
Petitioner Could Have Obtained An Expert Opinion When He Filed The Original 
Post-Conviction Petition In This Action. 
In denying Petitioner leave to amend into his petition either of his two proposed counts, 
the court below reasoned that because forensic scientists in 1987 would have reached the same 




Petitioner and his defense counsel could have known of a potential 
Brady claim when the first post-conviction petition was filed in 
2002 .... Petitioner could have obtained an expert to review the 
report when he filed the Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific 
Testing in 2002. Therefore, any grounds for a potential 
Brady claim could have been known when the first petition for 
post-conviction relief was filed in 2002. 
R. Vol. I, p.215. Thus, the court concluded that with regard to each of the claims contained in 
the two proposed counts, Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code Section 19-
2719( 5)( a). Id & Id at 216 ("Because the claim of innocence is based on the same allegations 
as the Brady claim, the Court finds the claim of innocence was known or could have been known 
when Petitioner filed the first petition in 2002.") 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Petitioner filed a motion to amend two counts ( which, between them, included several 
claims) stemming from the then-very recently obtained opinions of a genetic biology expert 
regarding a Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory report considered by itself and, as well, in 
tandem with Idaho state laboratory test results. Specifically, Petitioner sought to amend into his 
petition claims of outrageous prosecutorial misconduct as well as the claim that he is actually 
innocent of the offenses of conviction ( and any and all of their lesser included offenses). The 
prosecutorial misconduct claims include but are not limited to claims that the prosecution elicited 
but failed to correct its forensic expert's false testimony that his testing established that Petitioner 
was among the potential contributors of the semen removed from the victim's vagina and mouth 
even though the prosecution knew or should have known that the FBI laboratory test results, 






Petitioner was put on notice of those claims when his retained expert genetic biologist, 
Dr. Hampikian, provided his opinion that the FBI test results excluded Petitioner as a contributor 
of the semen collected from the victim. Petitioner received that opinion within forty-two days of 
filing his Motion To Amend Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and supporting documents. 
Petitioner had retained Dr. Hampikian out of an abundance of caution in this case where the 
Petitioner's life hangs in the balance, not because he had at that time evidence of prosecutorial 
misdeeds. The district court denied the motion to amend, ruling that Petitioner failed to satisfy 
the timeliness requirements ofldaho Code Section l 9-2719(5)(a) because he could have obtained 
an expert opinion when he filed his 2002 Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing. 
Thus, there are three related issues in this appeal: 
(1) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to 
amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the prosecutorial misconduct claims until 
he consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and even though neither trial 
defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of 
prosecutorial misdeeds, absent notice of their existence; 
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to 
amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the factual basis of the actual innocence 
claim, and even though neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any 
obligation to search for evidence of actual innocence; and 
(3) Whether denying Petitioner who presented a prima facie claim of actual innocence 
leave to litigate that claim even though he may not otherwise have met the timeliness 
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requirements ofldaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) violated his right to bring such claims 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 4901(a)(4) and whether it violated his rights against 
cruel and unusual punishment and to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Idaho 
Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 and 13; and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 642, 8 P.3d 
636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests would result in Idaho 
courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive post-
conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been 
suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct."). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CHARGING 
PETITIONER WITH THE DUTY TO VERIFY THAT THE 
PROSECUTION DID NOT OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION THROUGH 
DECEIT VIA AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
Despite the fact that neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners are duty-bound 
to search for prosecutorial deceit and other misdeeds absent notice of its existence, the court 
below ruled that, "Since Petitioner has possessed the FBI report since 1987, and there is no 
contrary evidence, the Court finds that Petitioner could have obtained an expert to review the 
report when he filed the Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing in 2002." 
Idaho law is clear that a successive postconviction petition is timely if (1) it was not 
reasonable to expect the petitioner to have known of its underlying facts at the time of his first 





discovering the underlying facts. In Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257,261, 32 P.3d 151, 155 (Idaho 
2001), this Court held "that even if the State violated a petitioner's right to due process by 
withholding evidence, the petitioner was required to raise this issue, like other constitutional 
issues, within the time frame mandated by I..C. §19-2719. See McKinney [v. State], 133 Idaho 
[695,] 706-07, 992 P.2d [144,] 155-56 [(Idaho 1999)]." When considering successive 
postconviction petitions, "the Court initially examines whether the information alleged by [the 
petitioner) to be exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of [the petitioner's] 
first post-conviction petition." Id 
This Court has noted several strict rules created and enforced to ensure the integrity of 
trials as a truth finding process. These rules and their purpose are relevant here. 
Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that 
prosecutors have fuJiy discharged their official duties, including the 
duty to disclose exculpatory material. [Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 286-87 (1999)]. 
A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false 
testimony, to obtain a conviction[,] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 
(1959)[, and that] [t]his standard applies not only to false evidence 
solicited by the prosecution, but also to false evidence that the 
prosecution allows to go uncorrected. Id. A stricter materiality 
standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use 
of false testimony than to cases where the prosecution has failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at l 03-04. This is 
because these cases "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking 
function of the trial process." Id at 104. In Bagley, the U.S. 
Supreme Court quoted Agurs for "the well-established rule that a 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (quoting Agurs, 
427 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added). "(T]he fact that testimony is 
perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 680. 
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Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000). 
I. The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Petitioner's Motion To 
Amend Proposed Count Two's Claims Into The Petition On The Ground 
That Petitioner Could Have Consulted With An Expert At Time He Filed 
The Original Post-Conviction Petition In This Action. Denying Legal 
Recourse To Petitioner For The Prosecution's Egregious Misconduct 
Violated Petitioner's Rights Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 
(1959); The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The 
United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 6 (Cruel And Unusual 
Punishment Prohibited) And 13 (Due Process Guaranteed) Of The Idaho 
Constitution; As Well As Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d 636, 642 
(2000). 
Just as defense attorneys "are entitled to rely on the presumption that prosecutors have 
fully discharged their official duties, including the duty to disclose exculpatory material," Sivak 
at 642, 647, they are entitled "to assume that. .. prosecutors [ will] not stoop to improper litigation 
conduct to advance prospects for gaining a conviction" such as eliciting false testimony. Banks 
v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694 (2004). However, defense lawyers and their clients may not play 
the ostrich by ignoring available evidence putting them on notice of a claim until they have 
gathered "a complete cache of evidence." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 
870, 875 (2008) (noting that in capital cases, the Court "has measured timeliness [for successive 
postconviction petitions] from the date of notice, not the date a petitioner assembles a complete 
cache of evidence."). Thus, despite the misconduct in Sivak, the Court held that because (l) the 
witness had admitted in a deposition to facts contradicting his trial testimony regarding what the 
prosecution gave him in exchange for his testimony and (2) that deposition was available to Mr. 









In stark contrast to Sivak, here Petitioner had no deposition or other evidence putting him 
on notice that the prosecution elicited false testimony from its forensic expert, that the FBI 
testing exonerated Petitioner, and, therefore, that the prosecutor failed to correct either its 
forensic expert's false testimony or his grossly misleading testimony. The facts relevant to the 
petition's timeliness in the case at bar is strongly analogous to those in Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
932,934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-5 (Idaho 1990). The district court denied relief in Mr. Stuart's 
first postconviction action in May, 1987. On the appeal of that court's denial of relief in his 
second postconviction action, this Court ruled that: 
The accompanying affidavits make it very evident that the facts 
surrounding the second petition were not known until the summer 
of 1988. It was not until a Mr. Oliver, a former Police Officer for 
the city of Pierce, informed the appellant's attorney that he was 
aware of the recording of the appellant's conversations that these 
facts came to the attention of the appellant and his attorney. Since 
the facts were unknown at the time of the first petition, we hold 
that the second petition is timely and proper. 
Id. Similarly, here, Petitioner filed his successive postconviction petition within forty-two days 
of learning that "Dr. Hampikian determined that the FBI report excluded Petitioner as a 
contributor of the seamen [sic] discovered at the murder scene and tested by the FBI." R. Vol. I, 
p. 214 (lower court's decision denying motion to amend). Out of an abundance of caution based 
in part on their keen awareness that Petitioner stands sentenced to death and not at all on any 
evidence (because there was none) putting him on notice of any of the claims in his proposed two 
count amendment, Petitioner's counsel consulted with Dr. Hampikian. Dr. Hampikian' s opinion 
was the sole evidence putting Petitioner on notice of each of the claims in his proposed two count 
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amendment. As in Stuart, the Court should reverse and remand with instructions to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's claims. 
As well, the prosecutor's misconduct relating to false testimony in this case far 
outstripped that in Sivak. Among the claims considered in Sivak was one which concerned 
testimony from a lay witness to whom Mr. Sivak purportedly made admissions regarding the 
offense of conviction. That witness testified falsely about what he had asked for and what he had 
received in exchange for his testimony from the prosecutor's office. Much of that "testimony the 
prosecutor knew to be inaccurate." Id. at 645, 650. As in Sivak, the prosecution elicited false 
testimony, knew it, and failed to correct it. But the relevant similarities stop there. Most 
! important, the defense in this case did not have a deposition or any other evidence contradicting 
or even suggesting that the prosecution's expert forensic witness' testimony was false. As well, 
there were critical differences between the testifying witnesses in the instant case and in Sivak, 
including: 
• Here, the testifying witness was a forensics expert who testified about the results 
of scientific testing, thereby carrying with him an assumption of credibility, and 
who had no prior convictions. By contrast, the testifying witness in Sivak was a 
former Ada County inmate who testified to jailhouse conversations with the 
petitioner. The Sivak jury knew that the testifying witness had recent prior 
convictions for burglary (1978) and passing insufficient funds checks (1979), had 
recently escaped from an Idaho penitentiary (September, I 979), that while escaped 
had committed another burglru:y, was captured and again placed in jail and again 







that second escape. Id at 639,644 at n. 3. Consequently, the withheld 
information in Sivak-the fact and particulars of the testifying witness' deal with 
the prosecution in exchange for his testimony-would likely have had much less 
impact than the jurors in the instant case learning that the professional expert 
forensics expert had testified falsely that scientific testing showed that Petitioner 
was a potential contributor of the semen. 
Here, there is no record evidence suggesting and no reason to believe that the 
testifying witness requested or received from the prosecution benefits of any kind 
in exchange for his testimony. However, in Sivak, the testifying witness testified 
that after testifying at the preliminary hearing, '" my escape charge got dismissed 
for me."' Id 639, 644. Again, then, the testifying witness' credibility in Sivak was 
already suspect, as compared to the prosecution's expert forensic witness in this 
case who was presented as an objective scientist without any stake in his 
testimony or the case. Consequently, the withheld information would likely have 
had much more impact on the jurors here than those in Sivak. 
The relevant critical differences between this case and Sivak extend beyond those 
between the testifying witnesses. They include: 
• In this case, the witness testified to scientific testing and results, not 
conversations. But in Sivak~ the witness testified to having had a conversation in 
which the petitioner had implicitly admitted to killing the victim, explained that 
he had shot and stabbed her so many times "'[b ]ecause she kept on 





.22 and that he had held a grudge against the victim. Id at 644,639. 
Conversations are much more easily subject to misperception and 
misinterpretation than are scientific tests and their results. 
• In Sivak, the witness did not testify in a misleading or false way on crossw 
examination. Here, however, the prosecution's forensic expert testified in a 
grossly misleading way on cross-examination, and the prosecution did nothing to 
correct it. 
• In Sivak, the prosecution did not grossly exaggerate the witnesses testimony. By 
contrast, in this case, the prosecution transformed its expert's testimony that 
Petitioner was included within the universe of possible contributors of the semen 
(and thus possibly the guilty party) into his being the "match." 
Each of these differences underscores the particular role which the false testimony played in the 
respective cases. In the instant case, except for the vigorously contested "I did it" statement, the 
inculpatory evidence was wholly circumstantial. Consequently, considered individually or 
cumulatively, each of the prosecutorial misconduct claims contained in proposed Count Two was 
more egregious here than in Sivak. 
II. This Court Should Not Put Its Imprimatur On Killing An Individual Who 
Has Proffered A Prima Facie Case Of Actual Innocence. Affirming The 
Lower Court's Ruling Will Have This Effect Because There Is No Other 
Legal Recourse Open To Petitioner For Pressing His Actual Innocence 
Claim. 
Petitioner's claim in his proposed Count Three, actual innocence, was based on the same 





Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, together with (1) an FBI document dated about six 
months pre-trial and memorializing the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to 
the PGM testing for the prosecution by the state laboratory of swabs of semen removed from the 
victim's mouth and vagina' (see R. Vol. I, p.120-22 (Exhibit I)); and (2) a June 20, 2005, sworn 
statement, from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State 
University associate professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice 
Administration,6 in which he noted that while the State of Idaho Forensic Laboratory testing 
on swabs of semen removed from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential 
contributor of the semen[,] ... the more refined test performed by the FBI7, at the request 
of the Idaho lab, did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See R. 
Vol. I, p.123-7 (Exhibit 2)) 
The Court below denied the motion to amend, ruling that, "[b ]ecause the claim of 
innocence is based on the same allegations as the Brady claim, the Court finds the claim of 
innocence was known or could have been known when Petitioner filed the first petition in 2002." 
R. Vol. I, p.216 (Opinion .... ). Petitioner incorporates the arguments from Section I, supra. For 
'The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to 
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found 
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's 
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As 
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state 
laboratory. 
6Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to 
full professor and granted him tenure. 
7Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI 
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit l and dated about six months pre-trial. 
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fue same reasons fuat Petitioner contends that he could not have reasonably been expected to 
know of the claims contained in his proposed Count One when he filed his 2002 petition or at 
any earlier date, he also contends he could not have reasonably been expected to know of the 
factual basis of the actual innocence claim at that time either. 
Affirming the lower court's denial will close the door to Petitioner who has proffered a 
primafacie case of actual innocence. Denying Petitioner the ability to litigate his prima facie 
claim would violate his rights under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v. 
Calderon, 21 I F.3d I 148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices 
in Herrera would have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298 (1995); Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho 
Constitution, Article 1, Sections l (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 ( equal 
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas 
corpus guaranteed), 6 ( cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 ( due process guaranteed), 
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count 
Three, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Petitioner filed his motion to amend two counts into his pending postconviction 
petition within forty-two days of having notice of the claims contained in those proposed counts, 
fue court below abused its discretion in denying that motion. As well, because Petitioner 
presented a prima facie claim of actual innocence, denying him leave to litigate that claim 
18 
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violated his rights under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 
1148, I 165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices in Herrera would 
have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); 
Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, 
Sections 1 (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 ( equal protection guaranteed), 3 (United 
States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas corpus guaranteed), 6 (cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited), 13 ( due process guaranteed), and the United States Constitution, 
Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments; and it also violated his right to bring such claims pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
490l(a)(4). 
For all these reasons, this Court must remand the case to the district court with 
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